Automatic control of physiological variables is one of the most active areas in biomedical engineering. This paper is centered in the prediction of the analgesic variables evolution in patients undergoing surgery. The proposal is based on the use of hybrid intelligent modelling methods. The study considers the Analgesia Nociception Index to assess the pain in the patient and remifentanil as intravenous analgesic. The model proposed is able to make a one-step-ahead prediction of the remifentanil dose corresponding to the current state (...) of the patient. The input information is the previous remifentanil dose, the ANI variable and the electromyogram signal. Modelling techniques used are Artificial Neural Networks and Support Vector machines for Regression combined with clustering methods. Both training and validation were done with a real dataset from different patients. Results obtained show the potential of this methodology to calculate the drug dose corresponding to a given analgesic state of the patient. (shrink)

This article presents a review on two methods based on dynamic mode decomposition and its multiple applications, focusing on higher order dynamic mode decomposition and spatiotemporal Koopman decomposition. These methods are purely data-driven, using either numerical or experimental data, and permit reconstructing the given data and identifying the temporal growth rates and frequencies involved in the dynamics and the spatial growth rates and wavenumbers in the case of the spatiotemporal Koopman decomposition. Thus, they may be used to either identify and (...) extrapolate the dynamics from transient behavior to permanent dynamics or construct efficient, purely data-driven reduced order models. (shrink)

Ningún luriter debe leerse lejos de su propio Sitz im Leben. El de Parménides se sitúa en el sur de Italia a finales del siglo VI y principios del VII. Se trata de un entorno cultural rico en comunidades órficas y pitagóricas, en el que el antiguo orden mítico-feudal está siendo superado y el politeísmo de Homero es objeto de severas críticas. En consecuencia, el poema de Parménides está impregnado de un profundo ímpetu religioso, que se convierte en la piedra (...) angular de su correcta interpretación. Un análisis riguroso de los fragmentos 6 y 7, en los que se discute ampliamente la tercera vía, muestra, en primer lugar, que esos fragmentos constituyen una unidad autónoma dentro de la obra, que no puede relacionarse con ninguna otra de sus partes; y, en segundo lugar, que una interpretación convincente de esa tercera vía apoya la lectura teológica del poema, como sugiere W. Jaeger, y al mismo tiempo preserva la perfecta coherencia del pensamiento parmedineano frente a otras interpretaciones más recientes, empezando por Burnet y Reinhardt. (shrink)

Tarski's 1936 paper, “On the concept of logical consequence”, is a rather philosophical, non-technical paper that leaves room for conflicting interpretations. My purpose is to review some important issues that explicitly or implicitly constitute its themes. My discussion contains four sections: terminological and conceptual preliminaries, Tarski's definition of the concept of logical consequence, Tarski's discussion of omega-incomplete theories, and concluding remarks concerning the kind of conception that Tarski's definition was intended to explicate. The third section involves subsidiary issues, such as (...) Tarski's discussion concerning the distinction between material and formal consequence and the important question ofthe criterion for distinguishing between logical and non-logical terms.§1. Preliminaries. In this paper an argument is a two-part system composed of a set of propositions P and a single proposition c. The expression ‘c is a [logical] consequence of P’ is used with the same meaning as the expression ‘c is [logically] implied by P’. The expressions ‘is a logical consequence of’ and the converse ‘implies’ are relational. Often, I shall be talking in the same sense of validity of an argument. Validity is a property of arguments; an argument with premise-set P and conclusion c is valid if and only if P implies c; i.e., c is a logical consequence of P. Notice that this notion of argument is strictly ontic; it does not involve any agent that thinks, determines or establishes that a given proposition is or is not a consequence of a given set of propositions. (shrink)

Each science has its own domain of investigation, but one and the same science can be formalized in different languages with different universes of discourse. The concept of the domain of a science and the concept of the universe of discourse of a formalization of a science are distinct, although they often coincide in extension. In order to analyse the presuppositions and implications of choices of domain and universe, this article discusses the treatment of omega arguments in three very different (...) formalizations of arithmetic. In Peano's formalization the domain is a restricted class of individuals, while the universe of discourse is the unrestricted class of all individuals. In Gödel's formalization the domain is a restricted class of individuals as in Peano's formalization, but the universe of discourse coincides with the domain. In Whitehead-Russell's formalization the domain is a class of logical notions in Tarski's sense, that are necessarily not individuals, whereas the universe of discourse is the unrestricted class of individuals as in Peano's formalization. The present approach emphasizes the viewpoint that the universe of discourse of a given discourse is important in determining which propositions are expressed by which sentences. (shrink)

A prepositional logic S has the Converse Ackermann Property (CAP) if (AB)C is unprovable in S when C does not contain . In A Routley-Meyer semantics for Converse Ackermann Property (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 16 (1987), pp. 65–76) I showed how to derive positive logical systems with the CAP. There I conjectured that each of these positive systems were compatible with a so-called semiclassical negation. In the present paper I prove that this conjecture was right. Relational Routley-Meyer type semantics are (...) provided for each one of the resulting systems (the positive systems plus the semiclassical negation). (shrink)

Etude de l'extension par la negation semi-intuitionniste de la logique positive des propositions appelee logique C, developpee par A. Urquhart afin de definir une semantique relationnelle valable pour la logique des valeurs infinies de Lukasiewicz (Lw). Evitant les axiomes de contraction et de reduction propres a la logique classique de Dummett, l'A. propose une semantique de type Routley-Meyer pour le systeme d'Urquhart (CI) en tant que celle-la ne fournit que des theories consistantes pour la completude de celui-ci.

A simple, bivalent semantics is defined for Łukasiewicz’s 4-valued modal logic Łm4. It is shown that according to this semantics, the essential presupposition underlying Łm4 is the following: A is a theorem iff A is true conforming to both the reductionist and possibilist theses defined as follows: rt: the value of modal formulas is equivalent to the value of their respective argument iff A is true, etc.); pt: everything is possible. This presupposition highlights and explains all oddities arising in Łm4.

The logic DHb is the result of extending Sylvan and Plumwood’s minimal De Morgan logic BM with a dual intuitionistic negation of the type Sylvan defined for the extension CCω of da Costa’s paraconsistent logic Cω. We provide Routley–Meyer ternary relational semantics with a set of designated points for DHb and a wealth of its extensions included in G3DH, the expansion of G3+ with a dual intuitionistic negation of the kind considered by Sylvan (G3+ is the positive fragment of Gödelian (...) 3-valued logic G3). All logics in the paper are paraconsistent. (shrink)

This article discusses two coextensive concepts of logical consequence that are implicit in the two fundamental logical practices of establishing validity and invalidity for premise-conclusion arguments. The premises and conclusion of an argument have information content (they ?say? something), and they have subject matter (they are ?about? something). The asymmetry between establishing validity and establishing invalidity has long been noted: validity is established through an information-processing procedure exhibiting a step-by-step deduction of the conclusion from the premise-set. Invalidity is established by (...) exhibiting a countermodel satisfying the premises but not the conclusion. The process of establishing validity focuses on information content; the process of establishing invalidity focuses on subject matter. Corcoran's information-theoretic concept of logical consequence corresponds to the former. Tarski's model-theoretic concept of logical consequence formulated in his famous 1936 no-countermodels definition corresponds to the latter. Both are found to be indispensable for understanding the rationale of the deductive method and each complements the other. This study discusses the ontic question of the nature of logical consequence and the epistemic question of the human capabilities presupposed by practical applications of these two concepts as they make validity and invalidity accessible to human knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle Rules, OK?José M. Villagrán (bio) and Rogelio Luque (bio)KeywordsAristotle, causes, philosophy, psychiatry, psychopathologyPérez-Alvarez, Sass, and García-Montes (2008) propose a theoretical approach to the nature of mental disorders (MD) that attempts to explain the type of reality they constitute. In line with this approach, they argue that (1) MDs should be considered not from within psychology and psychiatry, but rather from the realm of philosophy, so as to (...) avoid what they call the Charcot effect; (2) the resulting theoretical model is in contrast to naturalist models such as that of internal dysfunction, and involves “strong” constructivist assumptions from which they develop an anthropological perspective based on the clinician–patient situation; 3) this model is applicable, in principle, to all MDs (“at least to some extent”); and (4) it is based on the Aristotelian theory of the four causes.We would argue, however, that (1) it is precisely from within psychology and psychiatry that conceptual models accounting for MDs should be proposed; (2) the naturalist–constructivist dichotomy in these models should be deconstructed, and primacy given not to the ontological approach but to the epistemological one; (3) a theoretical model of this scope should account not only for MDs but also for physical disorders; and (4) only in this way would the Aristotelian theory of causes, understood as types of explanation (and therefore as epistemological approaches) be useful.Approaches from within and from WithoutFor Berrios (2006), the theoretical discourse in relation to the conceptualization of MDs in a particular sociocultural context can be formulated in two ways: on the one hand, in a centripetal fashion, using established philosophical systems (be it phenomenology [Jaspers 1977], logical empiricism [Hempel 1994], or analytic philosophy [Fulford, Thornton, and Graham 2006]). This centripetal approach can be used both by professional philosophers and by psychiatrists/psychologists. When developed by professional philosophers, such proposals, despite their possible brilliance, run the risk of being tangential to the psychiatric issues owing to a lack of first-hand experience of them (Murphy 2006). When developed by psychiatrists and psychologists, the majority of the proposals simply mix fragments of different philosophical systems, in either a kind of syncretism or collage that fails to take into account the contradictions between fragments, or a kind of pluralism that reflects, without entering into analysis, a sort of consensus among the different paradigms (Ghaemi 2003; Kendler 2005).A second way of formulating this theoretical discourse (according to Berrios) would employ a centrifugal approach from the very core of the disciplines, through the reflection of professionals (primarily, although not only, psychiatrists/psychologists with philosophical training) who would conceptualize the problems from within and develop a specific metalanguage for analyzing [End Page 265] them (Lanteri-Laura 1991; Reznek 1991; Sass 1992). Not all problems are of the same type. For those that are extrinsic to psychiatry/psychology (definition of the mental, the mind–body relationship, the distinction between causes and reasons, or interdisciplinary reduction), the methods common to the philosophy of science and of the mind can be used. However, issues intrinsic to the disciplines themselves (the nature of mental symptoms and how they are generated, how to explain their heterogeneity, what a MD is, how to diagnose and classify it, or how to implement a psychopathological project) cannot be dealt with using preestablished formulas, and require new and original proposals that take into account the nature of the disciplines and their object of study (Villagrán 2007).The authors of the target article base their preference for the centripetal approach for responding to one of the intrinsic questions of psychiatry (what MDs are) on the consequences of what they call the Charcot effect, a kind of variant of observer bias applied to psychiatric diagnosis. They offer as an example the classic diagnosis ad iuvantibus in its postmodern version, namely, the efficacy of the pharmaceutical industry in contributing to creating nosological entities for which their drugs are indicated. Consequently, clinicians are not only unable to surmount the substantial epistemological obstacles that hamper attempts to theorize, but also find themselves doomed to assuming an ingenuous essentialism that considers MDs as natural kinds (such as apples, trees, or dogs) determined... (shrink)

Research has shown that both physical exercise and cognitive training help to maintain cognition in older adults. The question is whether combined training might produce additive effects when the group comparisons are equated in terms of exercise intensity and modality. We conducted a systematic electronic search in MEDLINE, PsycInfo, and Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials databases to identify relevant studies published up to February 2021. Seven hundred and eighty-three effect sizes were obtained from 50 published intervention studies, involving 6,164 (...) healthy older adults, and submitted to a three-level meta-analysis. Results showed that combined training produced a small advantage in comparison to single cognitive training on executive functions, whereas both types of training achieved similar effects on attention, memory, language, processing speed, and global cognition. Combined training achieved higher training gains in balance than single physical training, indicating a transfer from cognitive training to balance. Performing cognitive and physical exercise simultaneously, and interactive training produced the largest gains in executive functions, speed, and global cognition, as well as the largest improvements in physical functions. Aerobic training was associated with higher effects in attention and fitness, whereas non-aerobic training produced larger effects in global cognition and balance. For all cognitive and physical outcomes, training resulted more advantageous when performed in a social context, even though individual training obtained similar results in balance as group training.Systematic Review Registration:www.crd.york.ac.uk/prospero/, identifier: CRD42020175632. (shrink)

Evidence has shown that negative distracting stimuli are most difficult to control when we are focused in a relevant task, while positive and neutral distractors might be equally overcome. Still, r...

Suplemento a / Some Additions to: José M. Sevilla, "Bibliografía viquiana en español" entradas / entries 1-266; ID., "Añadido a la Bibliografía viquiana en español" , entradas / entries 267-364. Ahora 62 nuevas entradas / 62 new entries now: 365-426.

This paper offers a particular intuitionistic negation completion of Urquhart's system C resulting in a super-intuitionistic contractionless propositional logic equivalent to Dummett's LC without contraction.

Suplemento a / Some Additions to: Jose M. Sevilla, "Bibliografía viquiana en español", Cuadernos sobre Vico, 1, 1991, pp. 179-196 ; ID., "Añadido a la bibliografía viquiana en español", Cuadernos sobre Vico, 3, 1993, pp. 199-205 ; ID., "Nuevo añadido a la Bibliografía Viquiana en español", Cuadernos sobre Vico, 5/6, 1995-1996, pp. 419-422 ; ID., "Tercer añadido a la Bibliografía Viquiana en español", Cuadernos sobre Vico, 7/8, 1997, pp. 451-455 . 307 nuevas entradas / 307 new entries nn. 500 - (...) 807. (shrink)

In their valuable call-for-action article, Wexler and Specker Sullivan (2023) propose an integration–inclusion–impact axis for “translational neuroethics,” to face the challenges and criticisms tha...

The basic quasi-Boolean negation expansions of relevance logics included in Anderson and Belnap’s relevance logic R are defined. We consider two types of QB-negation: H-negation and D-negation. The former one is of paraintuitionistic or superintuitionistic character, the latter one, of dual intuitionistic nature in some sense. Logics endowed with H-negation are paracomplete; logics with D-negation are paraconsistent. All logics defined in the paper are given a Routley-Meyer ternary relational semantics.

The present paper is a sequel to Robles et al. :349–374, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-019-09306-2). A class of implicative expansions of Kleene’s 3-valued logic functionally including Łukasiewicz’s logic Ł3 is defined. Several properties of this class and/or some of its subclasses are investigated. Properties contemplated include functional completeness for the 3-element set of truth-values, presence of natural conditionals, variable-sharing property and vsp-related properties.

The aim of this paper is to introduce an alternative to Łukasiewicz’s 4-valued modal logic Ł. As it is known, Ł is afflicted by “Łukasiewicz type paradoxes”. The logic we define, PŁ4, is a strong paraconsistent and paracomplete 4-valued modal logic free from this type of paradoxes. PŁ4 is determined by the degree of truth-preserving consequence relation defined on the ordered set of values of a modification of the matrix MŁ characteristic for the logic Ł. On the other hand, PŁ4 (...) is a rich logic in which a number of connectives can be defined. It also has a simple bivalent semantics of the Belnap–Dunn type. (shrink)

The logic TM is the result of adding the mingle axiom, M to Ticket Entailment logic, T. In the present study, it is proved that TM has the variable-sharing property . Ternary relational semantics for TM is provided. Finally, an interesting extension of TM with the vsp is briefly discussed.

El concepto de razón que emerge con Vico, y que será análogo al propuesto por Ortega, no es ya el de la razón física y pura, natural y abstracta, sino el de una razón vital e histórica, la cual viene a ejercitarse y expresarse como razón narrativa : aquélla única capaz de comprender "la lingua con cui parla la storia".The concept of reason that emerges with Vico, and that is analogous to the one proposed by Ortega, is not only the (...) one of physical and pure, natural and abstract reason, but rather the one of vital and historic reason, which comes to exercise itself and express itself as narrative reason: that only capacity of comprehension "la lingua con cui parla la storia". (shrink)

El presente estudio contiene algunas recientes indagaciones que continúan y se agregan a anteriores trabajos del autor sobre el problema de la recepción de Vico en la cultura hispánica del siglo XIX.The present study contains some recent investigations that continue to previous works of the author on the problem of the reception of Vico during the XIX Century in the Hispanic culture.

In this article, we propose a philosophical exploration on the main problems involved in two neurorights that concern autonomous action, namely free will and cognitive liberty, and sketch a possible solution to these problems by resourcing to a holistic interpretation of human actions. First, we expose the main conceptual and practical issues arising from the neuroright to “free will,” which are far from minor: the term itself is denied by some trends participating in the neurorights debate, the related concept of (...) ultimate control is also disputed, the understanding of free will depends on cultural context, and the exercise of being free to act in several domains may be covered by other regulations. Second, we analyze the historical origin of cognitive liberty, its current status, and its relation with free will. Third, we criticize the concept of decision in mainstream action theory and propose to conceive action as a unified process constituted by three explanatory, non-sequential dimensions: intention, decision, and action realization. Fourth, we discuss two possible cases involving neurotechnologies and suggest ways to interpret them according to a unified framework in which free will and cognitive liberty fall under a single neuroright to personal autonomy. Finally, we outline a recommendation to introduce freedom of thought and personal autonomy as complementary neurorights to protect both the internal and external dimensions of thought and action. (shrink)